The 1992 incorporation of an article by referendum in the SwissConstitution mandating that the federal government issue regulations onthe use of genetic material that take into account the dignity ofnonhuman organism raises philosophical questions about how we shouldunderstand what is meant by ``the dignity of nonhuman animals,'' andabout what sort of moral demands arise from recognizing this dignitywith respect to their genetic engineering. The first step in determiningwhat is meant is to clarify the difference between dignity when appliedto humans and (...) when applied to nonhumans. Several conceptions of humandignity should be rejected in favor of a fourth conception: the rightnot to be degraded. This right implies that those who have it have thecognitive capacities that are prerequisite for self-respect. In the caseof nonhuman organisms that lack this capacity, respecting their dignityrequires the recognition that their inherent value, which is tied totheir abilities to pursue their own good, be respected. This value isnot absolute, as it is in the case of humans, so it does not prohibitbreeding manipulations that make organisms more useful to humans. But itdoes restrict morally how sentient animals can be used. In regard togenetic engineering, this conception requires that animals be allowedthe uninhibited development of species specific functions, a positionshared by Holland and Attfield, as opposed to the Original Purposeconception proposed by Fox and the Integrity of the Genetic Make-upposition proposed by Rolston. The inherent value conception of dignity,as here defended, is what is meant in the Swiss Constitution article. (shrink)

Cases of acts of solidarity can be divided into at least two groups. Solidarity in a narrow sense of the term refers to what I label project-related solidarity; it is prevalent in the modern world at least as much as it was found in past worlds. In contrast, the philosophical discussions of "solidarity" refer to the altruism and mutuality typically found in close human relationships. This concept of "solidarity" is theoretically unfruitful and even misleading. I propose to abandon the term (...) "solidarity" in order to regain sight of the individual phenomena. When these are taken into consideration, a return to the community is no longer called for. I rather argue that modern societies are perfectly capable of inspiring feelings of loyalty and civic virtues, though not by resorting to the old sources of "solidarity". Modern forms such as free associations, participation and, not least, the existence of a liberal society itself are sufficient. Public discussions of solidarity are additionally distorted by frequent appeals to a normative sense of the term. The argument put forward in this collectivist context that an obligation of solidarity results from gratefulness to the community is not found to be convincing. Individuals are not obliged to be grateful to a nation in a way that would be normatively binding. (shrink)

It has been argued that environmental decision-making can be improved be introducing citizen panels. The authors argue that citizen panels and other models of citizen participation should only be used as a consulting forum in exceptional cases at the local level, not as a real decision-making procedure. But many problems in the field of environmental policy need nonlocal, at least regional or national, regulation due to the fact that they are of national impor-tance. The authors argue that there are good (...) reasons not to institutionalise national citizen panels. They advocate the view that more reasonable and more competent solutions can be found by introducing forms of direct democracy. (shrink)

Definition of the problem: A `experimental treatment' is defined as the use of a not yet approved medical treatment or product in a single patient outside the scope of regular clinical trials. Especially in oncology the patient is usually in a desperate situation and does not respond to other treatments. Even if he or she is fully informed about the risks he or she may occasionally make an irrational decision.Discussion of the problem: The moral problems in experimental treatments have to (...) do with the medical and scientific quality of the treatment and the patient-physician relationship. It is argued that there are also moral duties for pharmaceutical manufacturers and health insurrance companies.Conclusion: A regulation of experimental treatment trials is necessary both for physicians and for pharmaceutical manufacturers. (shrink)

In the public debate concerning novel foods, someconsumer groups claim a consumer right to have accessto certain kinds of food in the market. To discusssuch statements, the paper identifies the reasons thatmay justify liberal states to regulate food. Althoughit defends certain paternalistic activities, itfavours an autonomy-centred food policy. Autonomy andconsumer sovereignty require that certain conditionsare fulfilled. It may be argued that one suchcondition is that the consumer should have choices.Against this position, the paper defends the view thatliberty rights to choose (...) are limited to areas whichare of great importance for personal identity and thegood life. Local decisions in the area of foodconsumption do not have such importance, though globalones may have it. But even if this were true,government activity to protect such liberties shouldbe limited to the guarantee of formal conditions forthe good life of persons. It is not a legitimate taskof the government to safeguard specific conceptions ofthe good life. (shrink)